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It is hard to deny that France is back on the global scene: back from a period
of relative isolation—which is not unusual—and relative quietness, which is
more unusual.* The country’s recent period of renewed global activism—play-
ing a high-profile role in international debates on questions as diverse as the
future of the financial system to the potential conflict between Israel and
Iran—will most certainly reach a peak when France assumes the G20 presi-
dency in November 2010 and G8 presidency in January 2011. Perhaps more
importantly, France is back on the European scene, as was most visible in the
success of the French Presidency of the European Union in the latter half of
2008 and in France’s joint management (with Germany) of the crisis of the
Euro area in the spring of 2010. It is probably no coincidence that France
returns to global visibility during moments of difficulty, as it continues to
claim a role in global leadership.
Much more surprisingly, however, the so-called “French model” has also
been mounting something of a comeback. It has received unexpected praise
from a number of American and British media sources such as Newsweek
(“The Last Model Standing Is France”1) and The Economist (“How France is
surviving the economic crisis,” “The French model: Vive la difference!”2), and
also from free-market minded international organizations such as the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), which have praised the recent resilience of
the French economy.
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But what exactly is this apparently successful “French model” and how
can it help us understand the forces shaping France’s future?3 There are at least
two ways to understand the notion of “model.” The first is normative: a
national model is an example (usually praised for its economic and social per-
formance) that should be emulated by other countries wishing to be as suc-
cessful (e.g., the “German model” or “Japanese model” in the late 1980s).4 The
second is closer to the idea of system: a national model is a consistent set of
institutional features persisting in time. Persistence comes from consistency: as
long as the model is not destroyed by inner contradictions, it is able to hold
competing institutions together. This second definition of “model” is in ten-
sion with the first: it is difficult to emulate a national model, to copy-and-
paste institutions from one country to another, because a model is a system,
one whose institutions are part of a larger configuration. Thus, it makes little
sense to attempt to transpose the best aspects of the much-praised “Nordic
model” to, say, Spain, Italy or France, in order to solve these countries’ worst
problems (e.g., with unemployment or income inequality).5
As a system, then, what are the central elements of the “French model”?
Following in the footsteps of others, we can define it as “statist-republicanist”:
its economy relies heavily on market regulation and public intervention. How-
ever, its democracy revolves around republicanism, defined, after Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, as a social contract whereby a universal citizen, abstracted from
social and economic conditions (whether residential, religious, or ethnoracial),
engages in a direct relationship with the state representing the general will.
Because the global crisis is again “bringing the state back in,”6 it is not
 surprising that the present context is favorable to a revival of this “French
model”: the French economy being heavily regulated, the well-oiled state
tightly controls market excesses while massive public and social spending pro-
vides a buffer against the worst effects of the economic crisis. When com-
mentators praise the resilience of the “French model,” they actually admire
the statist facet of the French system that has allowed France to weather the
global crisis better than many other countries. 
Indeed, because of public regulation, French banks have fared better than
their counterparts in a number of advanced industrial societies. Moreover,
thanks to a higher domestic demand stimulated by an abundance of so-called
“automatic stabilizers,” France came out relatively well from the recession of
2009 (with a growth—or better yet de-growth—rate second only to Canada’s
among the G8 countries). This should come as no surprise: public spending
currently amounts to 55 percent of French gross domestic product (GDP),
more than any European country, with the exception of Sweden (at 56 per-
cent). Public employment also plays a major role in stabilizing the French
economy when the private sector plunges: wages in the public sector amount
to almost 15 percent of GDP. 
But the role of the state in France goes beyond macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion. It has been instrumental in building the public goods that now consti-
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tute France’s “long-term assets for human development.” (Note that the
human development index is replacing GDP growth as a measure of relative
societal success as the crisis in the financial sector is undermining of economic
orthodoxy.)7 In our view, these “long-term assets” are fourfold.
First, contrary to most developed countries, especially European coun-
tries, France’s demography is on an upward trajectory. While on average Euro-
pean countries experienced a decline of overall fertility from the mid-1970s
onwards, France was able to increase its birth-rate beginning in the mid-1990s,
thanks to pro-family social policies (Table 1). Currently, according to Eurostat,
France’s fertility rate surpasses that of all EU countries, including Ireland. 
Table 1. Total fertility (children per woman), medium variant, 1950-2010
Western Eastern
Period France Germany Europe Europe
1950-1955 2.73 2.16 2.41 2.82
1955-1960 2.71 2.30 2.49 2.75
1960-1965 2.85 2.49 2.67 2.45
1965-1970 2.61 2.32 2.46 2.12
1970-1975 2.31 1.64 1.98 2.14
1975-1980 1.86 1.52 1.67 2.08
1980-1985 1.87 1.46 1.63 2.09
1985-1990 1.81 1.43 1.59 2.10
1990-1995 1.71 1.31 1.50 1.62
1995-2000 1.76 1.34 1.51 1.29
2000-2005 1.88 1.35 1.58 1.26
2005-2010 1.89 1.32 1.59 1.35
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United
Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp.
The contrast with Germany is particularly striking. This country’s current
population is estimated at 82 million—that is, 20 million people more than
France. However, the United Nations Population Division predicts that by
2050, Germany’s population will have shrunk to 70 million and will surpass
France’s by only 3 million.8
France’s second long-term asset for human development is its level of
income inequalities, which is relatively low and has generally decreased in
recent decades (even if it has increased at the top of the income distribution
in recent years). OECD data show that France’s level of income inequalities
(measured by the Gini index) has declined since the mid-1980s, while it was
increasing in the other advanced industrialized societies, with damaging con-
sequences for the social fabric (Table 2). The welfare state has, of course, played
a crucial role in reducing income inequalities.
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Table 2. Gini Index for selected advanced industrial societies, Mid-1980s to
Mid-2000s
Mid-1980s Mid-2000s Difference
Canada 0,29 0,32 0,03
France 0,30 0,27 -0,03
Germany 0,26 0,30 0,04
Italy 0,31 0,35 0,04
Japan 0,30 0,32 0,02
United Kingdom 0,33 0,34 0,01
United States 0,34 0,38 0,04
OECD-24 0,26 0,31 0,05
OECD-22 0,24 0,30 0,06
Source: OECD, Growing Unequal.
France’s third long-term asset for human development is its health care
system. It has been ranked by several studies, most notably the 2000 World
Health Organization global ranking, as one of the best in the world. (It ranked
first in the WHO study, according to an aggregate health performance index.)
This, of course, is a controversial matter, and the French health care system is
being downsized. 
France’s fourth asset results from the public investment made in nuclear
energy in the late 1970s. The country currently displays the least carbon-
intensive economic growth in the developed world and fares comparatively
well on other indicators of overall environmental quality. For instance, it
ranked seven worldwide on the 2010 Environmental Performance Index.9
Table 3. Carbon Intensity of Growth* for G-8 Countries 
1990 2004
France 0,29 0,23
Italy 0,32 0,3
UK 0,47 0,34
Japan 0,37 0,36
Germany 0,58 0,38
US 0,68 0,56
Australia 0,81 0,58
Canada 0,66 0,69
Source: Energy Information Administration database. *(CO2 emissions per unit of
GDP, kilotons of CO2 per million 2000 purchasing power parity US$)
The combination of these four factors—fertility, fairness, health, and sustain-
ability—are the specific formula behind France’s societal success, or its “magic
square,” to borrow the phrase from growth economist Nicholas Kaldor. 
Of course, some of these indicators require further examination. France
does less well on measures of inequality other than the Gini Index, and if
other timeframes are considered. (Recent research has shown, for instance,
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that income inequalities at the top of the income distribution have substan-
tially increased in the last decade.) More importantly, we need to think
beyond these long-term indicators of human development to consider the
symbolic dimensions of collective life. These include whether a society: 1)
extends recognition to a large number of its residents by, for instance, adopt-
ing social policies that favor the integration of migrants and members of
underrepresented groups (gays, racial and religious minorities, etc.); 2) pro-
motes full cultural citizenship for its low-income population by, for instance,
adopting universal, as opposed to means-tested, mechanisms of redistribu-
tion; and 3) has collective myths about national identity and other aspects of
social imaginaries that sustain pride, hope, and a positive sense of collective
future and possibilities in the population.10
In the case of France, these symbolic dimensions of development may be
even more important than for other countries, because national myths play a
constant implicit or explicit role in public debates. Indeed, there remains a
striking gap between the country’s political reality and the dominant discourse
concerning the polity. This was suggested in the insightful volume co-edited
by Peter Hall and others, The Politics that Markets Make.11 The authors pointed
out that the political discourse concerning French economy, society, and
polity has not kept pace with the country’s profound structural transforma-
tions. In a sense, one could say that the future of France remains symbolically
imprisoned by the country’s past.
The contradiction between a changing reality and an inert political dis-
course has not reached a breaking point, due in large part to the central role
played by the state in the distribution of public goods. Indeed, for many
French citizens the global crisis confirmed the validity of belief in a strong
state and a heavily regulated economy. But for others, those who are more
attached to the republicanist than to the statist aspects of the French model,
this contradiction has become more and more unbearable. 
Put simply, as others have pointed out before us, a shadow French model
has developed, one that sustains not equality but segregation and discrimina-
tion. Societal success should have translated into greater social integration for
a larger portion of all those residing on French territory. But the opposite is
happening. Five years ago, urban riots shook the country in reaction to the
accidental death by electrocution of two teenagers chased by the police in the
town of Clichy-sous-Bois. Six months after those riots, we published an op-ed
article in the US arguing that “the frustration and resentment expressed by
French minorities was largely caused by the contradiction between a fanta-
sized equality and real-life discrimination.”12 This is even truer today than it
was then. 
At the end of 2009, the minister of immigration and national identity
(sic), Eric Besson, invited the population to participate in a grand unifying
debate on what it means to be French. The debate had to be cut short on
account of an abundance of racist statements and vilification of Muslims
Éloi Laurent and Michèle Lamont70
found in many public interventions and online postings. At the same time, a
governmental report showed that between 2005 and 2008 the rate of unem-
ployment among residents of French public housing projects had remained
twice that of the national average (37 percent for unemployed men between
15 and 24 years old in 2005 compared to 42 percent in 2008—an all-time
high). And study after study shows massive discrimination against minorities
in the labor market, the workplace, in dealings with police, and in gaining
access to nightclubs and other venues. Yet the “Plan Espoir Banlieue”13 pro-
moted by the new minister of urban integration, Fadela Amara, is widely per-
ceived to be ineffective, as it lacks proper funding and is not supported by
strong political commitment. Moreover, social scientists agree that French
anti-segregation and anti-discrimination policies are simply not working. It is
our belief that no infusion of grand rhetoric about “national identity” can
change that. However, the political developments of the summer of 2010 sug-
gest that the worst kind of identity politics will play a major role in the
upcoming electoral season: the French public and international press recently
witnessed Nicolas Sarkozy, the son of an Hungarian immigrant, casting aside
the French “of foreign origin,”14 while his minister of interior, Brice Hortefeux,
engaged in a campaign of harassment and deportation of Roma—amidst
strong protestation from the Catholic Church and from a wide range of NGOs. 
Whatever the rhetoric of isolation and stigmatization, the inability of the
French government to improve social integration goes beyond its dealings with
visible minorities. Indeed, it fails at integrating youth in general. The baby-
boomers continue to cherish the powerful mythology of a glorious memory of
May 1968 and the image of the triumphant students tearing down cultural bar-
riers by erecting barricades in the Quartier Latin. But this mythology hides the
reality that a large part of today’s French youth is excluded from the labor mar-
ket and lives from one short-term contract to the next, with little hope and few
prospects. This situation reverberates in French universities, where a generation
of young researchers finds itself facing professional dead-ends and has to con-
tend with a delegitimized evaluation system. There is no remedy in sight
despite governmental efforts to reform French research and higher education,
an attempt greeted by massive opposition on the part of academics, who feel
that their expertise is not being respected by state bureaucrats.15
The first article in this series, by Louis Chauvel, points precisely to the
generational gap that has developed in France and now threatens the democ-
ratic balance of the country. The second article by Arthur Goldhammer ele-
gantly tries to see through the mythological smoke to discern deeper trends in
the transformation of the idea of French culture. The final paper, on the
French carbon tax, also aims to assess the distance between words and deeds
concerning low-carbon economic development of France. 
As Alexis de Tocqueville famously wrote in Democracy in America, “When
the past is no longer capable of shedding light on the future, the mind can
only proceed in darkness.”16 In the contemporary era, the appeal of the French
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model—often contrasted with the American model—is the inclusion of mar-
ginal and downtrodden individuals and groups through active state interven-
tion, with the support of republicanism by France’s statist tradition. Lest that
legacy be lost, it is high time that France revisits its social contract, and
remembers its once celebrated inclusive collective imaginary. 
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